

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Request for Additional Information on Candidate Critical Systems

FROM:

Chief, Information Services Group
Room 1H19 CIA Hqs

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

19 September 1983

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

D/OCR
2E60

2.

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Director, ICS

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IHC

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PDS.

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19 September 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Community Staff *8* 22 SEP 1983

VIA : STAT
Director of Central Reference

FROM : STAT
Chief, Information Services Group

SUBJECT : Request for Additional Information on Candidate Critical Systems 25X1

REFERENCE : Memo for Executive Steering Group (COMPUSEC) fr DDCI dtd 20 Aug 1983, Same Subject

1. The background information you requested in referent on the RECON system is listed below. Our responses are keyed to the questions in attachment 1 of referent:

a. The answer to this question (why RECON was nominated as a candidate system) is contained in the Executive Director's memorandum to the DDCI on "Candidate Critical Systems for Computer Security" dated 21 July 1983. 25X1

b. The principal sources of intelligence information in the RECON system are Intelligence Community raw and finished reporting. Commonwealth reporting and open-source material is included in the data base on a selective basis only. See attached "List of Intelligence Derived Information". 25X1

c. The RECON data base contains information ranging from open-source, unclassified reporting through Top Secret collateral and Top Secret compartmented (including TK, GAMMA, BYE and RD) material. Material can be retrieved at various security levels, but RECON operates at system high, and system-high clearances are required for online, interactive access. 25X1

d. Access to the RECON data base is controlled by the use of unique user identifications and passwords which are issued on a yearly basis by the Data Management Branch (DMB) of OCR. All attempts to access the RECON system are recorded and stored on magnetic tape which is held in DMB for future reference. These tapes are searchable by the name of the individual attempting to access the system. All successful sign-ons in the RECON system also generate an audit trail by the name of the individual. These audit trails are monitored and reviewed by DMB and the supervisors of the five indexing units within the Information Services Group (ISG) of OCR. 25X1

In addition to online security responsibility, DMB establishes security rules to control access to all OCR data sets and software in the Office of Data Processing (ODP). DMB issues unique user identifications 25X1

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CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: Request for Additional Information on Candidate Critical Systems ☐

25X1

and passwords for access to batch RECON. The ODP batch security package (ACF2) generates a list of all those individuals attempting to access OCR data sets or software. This list is monitored and reviewed by Data Management Branch on a weekly basis. ☐

25X1

e. The classification, dissemination information and codeword entries for each document are developed from a standard translation table (see attachment 1) and are indexed in fixed fields of the RECON record. All fields of a RECON record can be modified only through maintenance by authorized OCR personnel. Authorization to perform maintenance on RECON data is granted only to the indexing personnel in the Office and is controlled by user identification and password. All maintenance transactions produce audit trails which are closely monitored by ☐ and the supervisors of the indexing units. ☐

25X1

25X1

f. There are no network interconnections to the RECON system. ☐

25X1

g. The interactive user community within CIA is composed of OCR personnel and analysts in Interim SAFE branches. All users of the system are cleared through TS/SI/TK-G. There are no interactive users outside of CIA. Extracted material from the RECON data base is provided the COINS network via magnetic tape on a bi-weekly basis for five COINS files; DEFEC, CHINA, FINTL, INSIG and SECSI. DEFEC contains data through the Secret collateral level; the other four files contain information through TS/SI/TK level. Specially controlled material (for example, GAMMA, ORCON, Exclusive For, etc) is not provided in these extracts. New magnetic tapes are used for the bi-weekly extracts for COINS and the COINS PMO returns previous tapes upon receipt of the new material. ☐

25X1

Requests for RECON service from OCR by the Intelligence Community and other government agencies are handled by the Staff Assistant/Indexing Officer of ISG on a case-by-case basis. Clearances of the requester are checked before the retrieval is performed against the data base and only the classification level for which the requester is cleared is included on the resulting listing. Standard canned queries are used to eliminate sensitivity controls which requesters from outside CIA are not allowed to receive on the final listing. These requests are primarily for DIA, NSA, FSTC, ☐ and State Department. ☐

25X1

2. If you have questions or comments on any of the above, please contact the Staff Assistant/Indexing Officer, ☐

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Attachments
As Stated

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Distribution:

Original & 1 - Addressee, w/att
1 - DCI/PS (Info Hndlg Plng), w/att
1 - D/OCR, w/att
1 - ISG/SAIO, w/att
1 - C/ISG. w/att

DI/OCR/O/C/ISG [redacted] (19 Sept 83)

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ATTACHMENT 1 (cont.)

CODEWORD CONTROL CODES

<u>CODE</u>	<u>CONTROL CHANNELS</u>
SI	SI Categories 2 and 3
SX	SI Categories X and 2X
SD	Delta (no longer used)
SG	Gamma
SA	Gamma (Name List) (no longer used)
TK	TKH (including TKH/SI)
TD	TKH Delta (no longer used)
TG	TKH Gamma
TA	TKH Gamma (Name List) (no longer used)
TB	TKH Byeman

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